Introduction
The Republic of the Philippines currently faces insurgent threats from both communist and Muslim factions within its borders. These insurgencies have been festering for many years, but may, in a "microcosmic" sense, represent the bridge between the classic Maoist/Communist "people's war" of the twentieth century and the religious-based Islamic independence movements that may be more common in the dawn of the twenty-first century. Using the operational factors of space, force, and time as a framework, an analysis of two of the ongoing insurgencies in the Philippines reveals that characteristics of the traditional communist-based insurgency are similar to the characteristics of the religious and ethnic-based insurgency.
This analysis must be prefaced with the idea that there is no template for success when fighting against an insurgency. Essentially, no two insurgencies are exactly alike. This analysis will draw out some of the common characteristics of these two insurgencies and how they relate to the operational factors. Understanding some of these characteristics may assist military planners in conducting counterinsurgency operations in the future.
Definitions of Space Force, and Time
If all military conflicts can be broken down into the primary factors of space, force, and time, then using these factors to evaluate the communist and Muslim insurgencies in the Philippines may provide us some insight into the similarities and differences of these two conflicts. Therefore, my argument will first present the similar characteristics of the two insurgencies. Subsequently, I will present some of the characteristics that differentiate the two insurgencies. In each case I will explain how these characteristics effect, or are influenced by, the factors of space, time, and force. By the conclusion of this analysis I hope to prove that these insurgencies are more similar than different.
Rather than restating definitions of the operational factors, and for the sake of brevity, Figure 1 provides the required definitions. Philippine independence was granted in 1946, the Huks, seen as communists, were not recognized as a legitimate political party and were blocked from the elective process. Thereafter, the Huks turned their efforts against the new American-sponsored government of the Philippines. The Huks, operating primarily in the Luzon area (see Space: Physical space encompasses land, sea, and airspace, including outer space, with all their features, which influence employment and effectiveness of land, sea, and air forces. In addition, legal, political, ethnic, or religious conditions considerably influence the use of physical space.
Time: Time lost can never be recovered, while space lost can be regained. Any military action requires a certain amount of time to plan, prepare, conduct, and sustain. For the attacker, time is required to consolidate his gains of space. This includes the time required to secure control of newly acquired areas and to militarily organize the space.
Force: Force refers to military sources of power. This can include such things as number of personnel, weapons and equipment, mobility, firepower, logistics, leadership, training, combat readiness, small-unit cohesion, morale, and discipline.
figure 2 for map), attempted to drive American influence out of the Philippines and establish a Socialist government for the "archipelagic" nation. The issue of Muslim splinter groups will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
Similarity: The Maoist Model
An insurgent force will rarely, in its infant stages, be able to project enough organizations that try to suppress them. The overriding concept being that if the Islamic rebels can rally enough support among the population and make it difficult enough for the AFP, the Philippine government might eventually find it too costly (and dangerous) to maintain control of the Islamic provinces in the south. 13 It is estimated that in 2000 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an offshoot of the MNLF, controlled up to ten percent of Mindanao. 14 Larry Cable referred to this type of conflict as a "defensive insurgency." More specifically defined, it occurs when a sub-group in a state, in this case a religious sub-group, seeks autonomy or independence for a specific region of the Around 1990 the movement split into two groups. "The Reaffirmists" supported Sison's ideas of the people's war in the countryside. "The Rejectionists" rejected the Reaffirmist strategy and called for unhindered war in the cities. 19 The Rejectionist strategy of using the NPA to attack the cities became a liability to the communist movement. During NPA operations on the island of Negros in 1997, cities were openly attacked by the insurgents.
However, the NPA was not ready to defend against counter-attacks and were routed by the AFP in force-on-force engagements. 20 This strategy ostensibly ignores force and time as factors in war. A smaller insurgent force must avoid large-scale force-on-force encounters to the greatest extent possible. This enables the insurgent army to survive and, over time, build greater support and force structure for ensuing battles. Mao Tse Tung refers to this concept as the "strategic retreat." He says, "The strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to defeat the enemy, when it finds itself confronted with a superior force whose offensive it is unable to smash quickly." terms. 23 The MILF called for a "jihad" against Christian Filipinos and the Manila government. Ultimately, Misuari gained governorship of the autonomous provinces (ARMM) while Hashim receded into the safe haven of his MILF strongholds. While the MNLF has somewhat "legitimized" itself, the MILF has continued to wage a guerilla war against the government. 24 The situation is even further confused by the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf. This group is said to be the terrorist arm of the MNLF and has become the primary target of the Philippines' most recent anti-terrorist operations. 25 As in the case of the communists, we see how the splintering of the movement weakens the overall cause. The MNLF has traditionally been more secular in its ideas about an independent Muslim state. The MILF follows the more fundamentalist view of Islam and would likely carry that over to an independent Mindanao. 26 Incidentally, many of the MILF's operatives are said to have been trained in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan during the 1990's. 27 These fissures in the Muslim movement illustrate again how force can be degraded in an insurgency when factions disagree over strategic objectives and the tactics used to attain them. If these various Islamic "fronts" set aside their differences, The Moro movement has also used terror as a tool in its struggle. The United
States is currently deploying Special Operations Forces (SOF) to the Republic of the
Philippines. This action is a branch to the ongoing war on terrorism. These forces will help train Philippine military and law enforcement personnel in the art and science of dealing with terrorists. 33 The target of the American-Filipino coalition is the MNLF splinter group, Abu-Sayyaf. The Abu Sayyaf is currently holding two Americans hostage on the island of Basilan while the group tries to negotiate a ransom. 34 There are reports that in the regions controlled by the MILF, churches, markets, and homes are pillaged regularly in an attempt to extort money from local inhabitants. 35 As recently as December 29, 2001 , Muslim rebels attacked a Christian village in the southern
Philippines and killed ten of its inhabitants.
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It is not uncommon for an insurgent force to use terror as a means to compensate for a lack of forces. An insurgent force that does not have the inherent capability to defeat its adversary by conventional means can use terror tactics as a temporary substitute for that lack of force. Professor John Waghelstein of the U.S. Naval War College explains in a lecture on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) that terrorists do not necessarily carry out attacks against their armed enemy, but will often conduct an attack on another target. In this type of attack, the real objective is to influence or impress a group of people. In theory, the population then sees how truly capable and dangerous the terrorist group can be. This then elicits some form of response from the government. 37 Trouble arises for the insurgents when their terror tactics backfire.
Current terrorist attacks in the Philippines have motivated the United States to deploy SOF to the Philippines to assist the government. 38 For an insurgent, this type of reaction from an opponent, or the opponent's allies, only exacerbates the insurgents' force ratio dilemma. Although the insurgent has tried to make up for a force shortfall with the use of terror, he has, in reality, created a worse situation.
The Counter-Argument: Ideology and Objectives
Ideology and objectives are probably the most obvious and pertinent differences between the communist and Muslim insurgencies in the Philippines. There seems little point in restating either the communist or Islamic ideologies in this forum. What seems more relevant is how the ideology and objectives of each movement relates to the factors of space, force, and time.
In the case of the Philippine communists, the plan has been to gain control of a space that encompasses the entire landmass of the Philippines. Like most communist insurgencies of the twentieth century, the Philippine communists have focused on complete overthrow of the existing government and institution of a communist/socialist structure in its place. The communist ideology leaves no room for non-communist parties/organizations to function within the state. The space must be completely conquered by the insurgent force. The insurgents must convince the masses that life will be better under communism. Once convinced of this, a local population provides support for the cause. If the government intervenes and is able to improve life for a local population, then the communists may lose support in that area, e.g., Ramon Magsaysay's reform policies of the 1950's. 39 Ultimately, the government must offer the people a "better deal" than the communists or put another way --"out-reform" the revolutionaries.
Additionally, in the case of the Philippine communist movement the sheer size of the space to be controlled is daunting. In a nation that is essentially an archipelago the Maoist model seems to have both advantages and disadvantages. Utilizing the natural barriers of the sea, mountains, and jungle, the NPA, even in its currently weakened state, has been able to continue operating in remote parts of Mindanao, the Negros Islands, Quezon Province, and the Cordillera and Bicol regions of Luzon. 40 The trouble in this case is that the same spatial factors that limit the counterinsurgents also limit the communists themselves.
The with the Moros than they have with the communists. Most likely this comes from a realization that they, the government, will never be able to fully quell the Moro independence movement. Its history is too old and its roots are too deep.
The Moros are struggling for a much smaller landmass than the communists.
Despite some of the settlements made by the MNLF and its split with the MILF, the rebels' overriding objective has been an independent Islamic state on Mindanao and its adjacent islands in the south. 44 This area is what Hashim refers to as the "Bangsamoro homeland." 45 A smaller space allows an insurgent force to become more familiar with the terrain, climate, sea conditions, etc., of its operating area. This can make it more effective than an insurgent force that is trying to conquer a large landmass. Although the Moros have attempted to create "pockets of resistance" similar to those of the NPA's communist model, it appears that they have not made any significant attempts to expand their area of control outside Mindanao and her adjacent islands.
Rebuttal to the Counter-Argument: The Economic Factor
The CPP was founded because its leaders felt that there was an unfair distribution of wealth in the country and that in Philippine society the common man did not have the same rights and privileges as those in the upper classes. Sison said, in reference to
Philippine socio-economics, that, "…the system of production is dominated by the combination of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class, which together with U.S. monopoly capitalism, prevent Philippine industrialization and allow the persistence of feudal and semi-feudal forms of exploitation." 46 believe that although political ideology is the primary reason given for the insurgency, economics comes in a strong second.
The Moro movement too contains economic issues. In the five provinces where the majority of Muslims reside, 83 % of all families live below the poverty line of $2,000
per year in pesos. 47 Filipino Muslims, in general, have a lower per capita income than that of their Christian countrymen. 48 Although the leaders of the Moro movement cite
Islam as the impetus for their revolution, the common Muslim might be just as interested in economic reform. The creation of ARMM has had a pacifying effect on leaders of the MNLF, many of whom have received financial compensation for their cooperation with the government. 49 It is possible that further economic aid to the Moro communities could have a similar effect on the remainder of the population. Those Muslims content with economic conditions under the existing government may be less likely to join or support an insurgent movement.
The issue of ideology is a significant difference between the two insurgencies studied in this paper. However, it can be argued that the economic factor can sometimes overshadow ideology in a revolutionary struggle. Opponents of an insurgency can exploit this economic factor. The Philippine government by improving economic conditions for its people can undercut the support base of the insurgents. Actions such as these reduce the space in which insurgents can operate and greatly hamper their ability to increase force structure. As Orlando Ambrocio states in his essay on Philippine insurgency, the military can address "the insurgency organism," but only government reform can address "the breeding ground" of insurgency.
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Conclusion
This paper has focused on the similarities and differences in two of the Philippines' ongoing insurgencies. Each one has its own root causes and ideologies. One is a holdover of the twentieth century communist revolutions, while the other is an ethnoreligiously based revolution that may be more common in the early twenty-first century.
On the surface these conflicts seem different. However, when analyzed in relation to the factors of operational warfare, it appears they are more alike than different. Use of the Maoist model, internal divisions in the movements, terror tactics, and desire for economic reform are all characteristics common to both insurgencies. Although every insurgency is unique, and no real template exists that applies to all, military planners may still be able to take some lessons learned from past insurgencies and apply them to counterinsurgency efforts in the future. 4 Donald Kirk, Looted, The Philippines after the Bases, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 141-2. 5 Ibid., 142.
